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INTRODUCTION
Most therapeutic interventions produced by pharmaceutical firms take the 
form of small molecule drugs,1 which are mass produced at low marginal cost 
and ingested orally. Drug therapies typically work by affecting the activity of 
human proteins, known in the industry as targets,2 that have been implicated in 
disease pathways. Thus far, medical science has identified safe and effective 
therapies for only a few hundred of the estimated 3000 protein targets in the hu-
man genome that are potentially susceptible to a drug.3 Moreover, pharmaceuti-
cal firms have encountered major obstacles in producing fundamentally new 
small molecule drugs, especially those that work against new targets. According 
to one report, an average of only three drugs that act on novel targets have 
reached the market annually in recent years.4
This highly visible problem has attracted commentary in scholarly articles,5
         1. We use the term “small molecule” to distinguish that class of compounds that can alter the 
activity of DNA or proteins but are not themselves proteins, peptides, or nucleic acids.  
         2. Ideally, potential targets would include not only individual proteins but also protein-protein 
interactions. See Michelle R. Arkin & James A. Wells, Small-Molecule Inhibitors of Protein-
Protein Interactions: Progressing Towards the Dream, 3 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 301 
(2004).
         3. Adrian Whitty & Gnanasambandam Kumaravel, Between a Rock and a Hard Place?, 2 
NATURE CHEMICAL BIOLOGY 112, 112 (2006) (giving an estimate of about three hundred proteins); 
Andreas P. Russ & Stefan Lampel, The Druggable Genome: An Update, 10 DRUG DISCOVERY 
TODAY 1607 (2005). Under the definition used in this Article, susceptibility to a drug, or “drugga-
bility,” is defined by whether the protein is capable of binding a chemical compound. This defini-
tion does not address the question of whether the binding will yield a result that is biologically use-
ful.
         4. See Brian P. Zambrowicz & Arthur T. Sands, Knockouts Model the 100 Best-Selling 
Drugs—Will They Model the Next 100?, 2 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 38, 39 (2003); see also 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT: SCIENCE, BUSINESS,
REGULATORY, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES CITED AS HAMPERING DRUG DEVELOPMENT 
EFFORTS 1 (2006) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items 
/d0749.pdf (stating that FDA submissions for new chemical molecules have generally declined 
since 1995, even though industry research and development increased 147% in inflation-adjusted 
dollars between 1993 and 2004). New chemical molecules are drugs that differ fundamentally in 
structure from prior molecules. They are, therefore, the type of drugs that are most likely to be ac-
tive against new targets (or show substantially increased efficacy against old targets). 
         5. See, e.g., Iain M. Cockburn, The Changing Structure of the Pharmaceutical Industry,
HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 10, 11; Fredric J. Cohen, Macrotrends in Pharmaceutical Innova-
tion, 4 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 78 (2005); Robert F. Service, Surviving the Blockbuster 
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government white papers,6 and the popular press.7 Government agencies, such as 
the National Institutes of Health,8 and industry insiders,9 have also recognized 
that one of the most serious pitfalls involves the difficulty of moving across the 
so-called “valley of death” that separates upstream research on promising genes, 
proteins, and biological pathways from downstream drug candidates. For exam-
ple, an upstream finding that a given protein is differentially expressed in indi-
viduals with a particular disease may suggest that the protein merits further in-
vestigation. However, much more work (especially medicinal chemistry) is 
necessary to determine how good a target the protein really is and whether a 
marketable drug candidate that affects the activity of the protein is likely to be 
developed.
As industry observers have noted, successfully translating upstream research 
into potential drugs will require experimentation with new models of research 
and development (R&D).10 In this Article, we propose one such initiative: inten-
sive, large-scale collaboration between academics, who possess unique skills in 
designing assays that can identify promising targets, and pharmaceutical firms 
that hold libraries of potentially useful small molecules as trade secrets, making 
them largely off limits to these same academic scientists. 
As we discuss below, conventional patent-based strategies for commerciali-
zation of university research, of the type envisioned by statutes like the Bayh-
Dole Act of 1980,11 are unlikely to foster such intensive collaboration. Moreover, 
while R&D alliances between small biotechnology firms and large pharmaceuti-
Syndrome, 203 SCIENCE 1796 (2004) (discussing low numbers of new chemical entities approved in 
recent years).  
         6. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., INNOVATION OR STAGNATION: CHALLENGE AND 
OPPORTUNITY ON THE CRITICAL PATH TO NEW MEDICAL PRODUCTS (2004), available at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/criticalpath/whitepaper.pdf.  
         7. See, e.g., Billion Dollar Pills, ECONOMIST, Jan. 27, 2007, at 69, 70 (“With its traditional 
approach, Big Pharma is not coming up with new drugs fast enough to fill its pipeline.”). 
         8. See, e.g., Christopher Austin et al., NIH Molecular Libraries Initiative, 306 SCIENCE 1138 
(2004); see also GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 40 (noting importance of “translational medicine” 
for addressing the drug discovery problem). 
         9. See, e.g., Christopher A. Lipinski, The Anti-Intellectual Effects of Intellectual Property, 10 
CURRENT OPINION IN CHEMICAL BIOLOGY 380 (2006). 
       10. See, e.g., DataMonitor, Addressing Pharma's R&D Productivity Crisis: Technical and Stra-
tegic Initiatives To Improve Core Drug Discovery Capabilities, http://www.market-research-
report.com/datamonitor/DMHC1960.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2007) (noting that “[c]ompanies must 
fundamentally review R&D business models and exploit new strategies for re-establishing core 
drug discovery expertise”). 
       11. Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at 35 
U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000)). 
 PATHWAYS ACROSS THE VALLEY OF DEATH 
57
                                                     
cal companies can perhaps fill some of the collaboration gap, thus far these verti-
cal alliances have not appreciably stimulated productivity in the area of small 
molecules.12 To achieve the goal of inducing more well-trained “eyes” to search 
chemical space for useful molecules, we need a contract-based platform that 
makes these molecules broadly available to academic experts without compro-
mising future patents. 
The collaborative initiative we propose takes its inspiration from existing 
horizontal collaborations between pharmaceutical firms, which focus on identify-
ing markers of drug safety and efficacy. However, our proposed effort aims to 
identify potential drugs that may someday reach the market and generate reve-
nue. We therefore need to define ownership more deliberately than do current 
collaborations, which focus on information that is generally considered pre-
competitive at all stages. Although firms would not bring specific patents to the 
table ex ante (as they do, for example, in most vertical R&D alliances between 
smaller biotechnology firms and larger pharmaceutical companies),13 future intel-
lectual property rights would nonetheless be suitably allocated among collabora-
tors.14 Moreover, unlike existing horizontal collaborations that have focused on 
safety and efficacy issues, our proposed initiative would deliberately integrate 
       12. These alliances have been more successful in increasing productivity in the area of biologi-
cal macromolecules (a class of specialty drugs known as “biologics”) like proteins and large pep-
tides. See Cockburn, supra note 5, at 12, 14; Service, supra note 5, at 1797-98. However, such bio-
logics are expensive to develop and hence quite costly to patients (with prices ranging from 
thousands to hundreds of thousands of dollars for an annual supply). Moreover, the absence of a 
generic regime for biologics, see infra note 29, means that their prices do not decrease to any mean-
ingful extent even after patents expire. See, e.g., Geeta Anand, As Costs Rise, New Medicines Face 
Pushback, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2007, at A1 (making these points and noting that spending on 
specialty drugs rose twenty-one percent in 2006, as contrasted with six percent for non-generic, 
non-specialty (i.e., small molecule) drugs); Geeta Anand, Rx for an Industry: As Biotech Drug 
Prices Surge, U.S. Is Hunting for a Solution, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2005, at A1 [hereinafter Anand, 
Rx for an Industry] (noting that spending on specialty drugs represents twenty-five percent of na-
tional spending on biopharmaceuticals).
       13. D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Strategic Alliances, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 303, 308 
n.29 (noting that in a sample of 125 genomics alliances, 113 involved the licensing of intellectual 
property by smaller technology firms); cf. Josh Lerner & Robert P. Merges, The Control of Techno-
logical Alliances: An Empirical Analysis of the Biotechnology Industry, 46 J. INDUST. ECON. 125, 
132 (1998) (noting that biotechnology firms with more intellectual property rights exercised more 
control over the alliance). 
       14. See generally OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 29-55 (1995) 
(discussing the importance of ex ante property rights allocation). Ex ante, the information at issue 
in our proposal is not patentable. Boilerplate patent law does not allow patents on biochemical in-
ventions of unknown function. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1097-99 
(Jan. 5, 2001).
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academic scientists as a built-in vertical component. 
We situate our proposal in the economic literature that has analyzed transac-
tion costs and incomplete contracting in the context of inter-firm R&D alli-
ances.15 The inter-firm alliance we propose would simultaneously redound to the 
financial benefit of the pharmaceutical industry and promote the interests of pub-
lic sector researchers. Most importantly, under our scheme intellectual property 
would be used creatively to secure efficient pathways across the gap that sepa-
rates upstream research from downstream products—a gap so economically per-
ilous that it has earned the “valley of death” moniker.16 If these arrangements 
generated a larger number of efficacious drugs, the public at large would become 
the ultimate beneficiary. 
In Part I, we frame the problem and describe some alternative efforts, exist-
ing and proposed, to accelerate drug development. In Part II, we examine several 
new pharmaceutical industry collaborations that provide some precedent for our 
proposed collaboration. In Part III, we set out our proposed multi-firm collabora-
tion model. Finally, in Part IV, we discuss the perspectives of various stake-
holders (e.g., pharmaceutical companies, academic researchers, nonprofit fun-
       15. See, e.g., Suzanne Majewski & Dean V. Williamson, Incomplete Contracting and the 
Structure of R&D Joint Venture Contracts, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
201 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2004) (arguing that the allocation of property rights in innovation gener-
ated by R&D partners is an important part of contract design, particularly in patent sensitive indus-
tries like the biopharmaceutical industry); Rachelle Sampson, The Cost of Misaligned Governance 
in R&D Alliances, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 484 (2004) (finding that alliance governance based on 
transaction cost arguments substantially improves collaborative benefits). The economic literature 
on incomplete contracting grows out of the literature on transaction cost economics (TCE). Both 
literatures emphasize the ex ante and ex post transaction cost challenges that managing uncertain 
future conditions poses for efficient contracting. Unlike the TCE literature, however, the property 
rights strand of the incomplete contracting literature tends to stress the role of ex ante property 
rights allocation. A related literature discusses how the availability of statutory intellectual property 
rights (typically patent rights) in modular information defines the boundaries of the firm and may 
also facilitate inter-firm market transactions. See, e.g., ASHISH ARORA ET AL., MARKETS FOR 
TECHNOLOGY: THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION AND CORPORATE STRATEGY (2001); Ashish Arora & 
Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights and Firm Boundaries, 13 INDUS. &
CORP. CHANGE 451 (2004); Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Bal-
ancing Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 575. This 
literature is not as directly relevant to our proposal, as we do not purport to alter the statutory stan-
dards by which patent rights are granted or propose new statutory rights.  
       16. Although we focus here on translation of biological research into small molecule drugs, the 
term “valley of death” is widely used to describe difficulties of market translation across different 
fields of scientific endeavor. See, e.g., COMM. ON ACCELERATING TECH TRANSITION, NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, ACCELERATING TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION: BRIDGING THE VALLEY OF DEATH 
FOR MATERIALS AND PROCESSES IN DEFENSE SYSTEMS (2004).
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ders), with a view toward finding common ground on which to develop the pro-
posed public-private partnership. We also discuss the possibility of single firm 
public-private partnerships, which could represent a desirable option if a com-
parison of pharmaceutical firm libraries showed substantial overlap among them. 
We conclude by considering briefly antitrust concerns as well as the broader im-
plications of the collaborative framework we construct for small molecule librar-
ies.
I.   FRAMING THE PROBLEM
Biomedical research in the pharmaceutical industry mainly focuses on small 
molecule chemical compounds. In contrast with proteins or other biologics, small 
molecule chemicals are usually mass produced at low marginal cost and are taken 
orally.17 Many pharmaceutical firms own collections, or “libraries,” of hundreds 
of thousands of small molecules that they have either synthesized internally or 
have purchased from outside vendors. Because the functional attributes of these 
molecules have not generally been studied in any depth, they typically do not 
meet even the relatively lax standards for patentability currently applied by the 
courts.18 To protect their investment, firms impose a strict regime of trade se-
crecy.  
In order to test the molecules for biological activity pertaining to disease 
processes, pharmaceutical firms must screen them against interesting proteins. 
The experimental protocol under which a target protein is screened is known as 
an assay. For the past few decades, pharmaceutical firms have been using high-
throughput screening (HTS)19 of small molecule libraries against assays contain-
ing target proteins to identify promising compounds that may lead to patentable 
drugs. HTS allows researchers to examine the interaction between the subject of 
the assay and all of the many thousands of small molecules housed in a single li-
       17. The systemic bioavailability of small molecules tends to be greater as well. Depending on 
their construction, small molecules may simply diffuse through tissues, whereas proteins must be 
transported.  
       18. See generally In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1565-68 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding the patentability 
requirement of utility met where molecule in question had shown cancer-fighting properties in a 
mouse model). 
       19. See Konrad H. Bleicher et al., Hit and Lead Generation: Beyond High-Throughput Screen-
ing, 2 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 369 (2003); W. Patrick Walters & Mark Namchuk, Design-
ing Screens: How To Make Your Hits a Hit, 2 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 259 (2003). The 
initial mechanical problem presented by high-throughput screening of thousands of chemical com-
pounds was solved by the use of robotic devices. Current state-of-the-art scanners use robotics to 
test more than one million compounds per day against various assays. See Gretchen Vogel, NIH
Gears Up for Chemical Genomics, 304 SCIENCE 1728 (2004). 
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brary in only a few hours, which vastly increases the scope of potentially useful 
information available to scientists. However, despite explosive growth in ge-
nomic and proteomic information about potential targets, and increasing levels of 
R&D spending,20 results of the HTS approach have thus far been disappointing. 
As noted earlier, the production of drugs that work against new targets has been 
particularly difficult.21
The pharmaceutical firms’ failure to find new drugs has been accompanied 
by a significant decline in sales revenues on existing drugs. Large pharmaceutical 
firms have typically generated very high sales revenues (and profits) through pat-
ents on so-called blockbuster drugs that they can market to large population seg-
ments. Prominent examples of blockbuster drugs include cholesterol-lowering 
agents, anti-hypertensives, and antidepressants. But patents on many blockbust-
ers are now expiring.22 Moreover, insurers are becoming reluctant to pay high 
prices for so-called “me-too” drugs—new products that represent mere incre-
mental improvements over existing molecules.23 In order to maintain profitabil-
ity, pharmaceutical firms must produce fundamentally new molecules that ad-
dress new targets and thus represent substantial improvements over existing 
treatment. 
A. The Dearth of Drugs Against New Targets 
Although the genome is estimated to contain at least 3000 druggable targets, 
       20. See GAO REPORT, supra note 4.
       21. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also Bleicher, supra note 19, at 370 
(“[D]espite the massive growth in screening compound numbers over the past 15-20 years, no cor-
responding increase in successfully launched new chemical entities has resulted.”). See generally
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 6. 
       22. See Adam Smith, Generic Drug Flood Headed Our Way, CNN MONEY, Aug. 3, 2005, 
http://money.cnn.com/2005/08/03/news/fortune500/generic/ (quoting drug industry analyst Andrew 
Forman of W.R. Hambrecht & Co. for the proposition that $100 billion worth of brand name drugs 
will lose patent protection between 2006 and 2010). 
       23. In 2005, sixty-eight percent of employers who provided insurance reported using tiered 
programs of co-payment to encourage the purchase of inexpensive pharmaceuticals (either generics 
or brand name drugs on which discounts had been negotiated). David Blumenthal, Employer-
Sponsored Insurance—Riding the Health Care Tiger, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 195, 199 (2006). His-
torically, the market signals sent to pharmaceutical firms have been less than efficient. Not only 
have health care payers generally been reluctant to use cost-effectiveness analysis in determining 
coverage, but the information necessary for determining cost-effectiveness—a public good—has 
been undersupplied. Jerry Avorn, Sending Pharma Better Signals, 309 SCIENCE 669 (2005). How-
ever, this situation may be changing. See id. Moreover, at least in some cases, incremental im-
provements may not even be patentable. See, e.g., Pfizer v. Apotex, 480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(holding that a new salt form of an existing chemical compound was not patentable).
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only a few hundred proteins are fully validated24 in the sense that they are shown 
to be biologically interesting and also susceptible to regulation by metabolically 
accessible, non-toxic drugs. Despite the infusion of new information about possi-
ble targets, some pharmaceutical companies continue to focus on this group of a 
few hundred, already validated targets. While this strategy may indicate exces-
sive risk-aversion, the fact that health insurance companies were once willing to 
pay high prices for me-too drugs remains a factor. Validating new targets is also 
more risky and complex now than in the past. Many observers believe most of 
the “low hanging fruit”—that is, targets that can be readily modulated by well-
tolerated, simple chemicals—has been found. This tendency to focus on a small 
number of known targets means that insufficient research has been undertaken on 
new targets.25
A number of discovery-oriented pharmaceutical firms continue to engage in 
target validation using in-house biological and chemical expertise. So do some 
small biotechnology firms. For the latter, patents on new targets can serve as the 
basis for both arms-length licensing and more vertically integrated R&D alli-
ances with pharmaceutical firms. One empirical study indicates that biotechnol-
ogy and pharmaceutical firms formed more than 1000 such two-firm alliances 
between 1993 and 2000.26 Despite these alliances, which may be responsible for 
a growing pool of therapeutics that are biological macromolecules,27 very few 
new small molecule drugs have emerged.28 Given escalating health care expendi-
tures, this dearth of cost-effective small molecules, which (unlike biologics) can 
be made at low marginal cost after relevant patents expire,29 is particularly unfor-
       24. See Whitty & Kumaravel, supra note 3. 
       25. See, e.g., Cockburn, supra note 5, at 12. It is theoretically possible that the low-hanging 
fruit that has already been found represents the sum total of biological targets on which research is 
justified as an economic matter. In other words, the costs of doing further research may exceed the 
health benefits achieved by any new drugs that might be found. There is little evidence to back this 
hypothesis, however. 
       26. Matthew J. Higgins, The Allocation of Control Rights in Pharmaceutical Alliances (Soc. 
Sci. Research Network, Working Paper No. 918980, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=918980 (describing an empirical study using data from Recombinant Capital, a California-based 
biotechnology consulting firm). For a discussion of such licensing and alliance activity at one of its 
historical spikes (around 2000-2001) see Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Bio-
pharmaceutical Industry, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 815-18 (2001).
       27. See Anand, Rx for an Industry, supra note 12 (noting the twenty-five percent market share 
now held by specialty drugs, primarily biologics). 
       28. See GAO REPORT, supra note 4. 
       29. Currently, there is no generic biologics regime. Moreover, even if a generic biologics re-
gime were established, bioequivalence is likely to be harder to prove in the context of biologics 
than in the context of small molecules. In any given case, the FDA may require clinical trials to 
demonstrate comparable safety and efficacy. This will create a barrier to entry for generic competi-
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tunate.
Moreover, while biotechnology firms could previously use early stage pat-
ents to secure venture capital funding or form vertical alliances, such patents no 
longer guarantee either funding or an alliance. Industry analysts have recently 
emphasized the biomedical “funding gap” resulting from the increasing reluc-
tance of venture capital and pharmaceutical firms to invest far upstream.30
The failure of efforts to fill the small molecule pipeline may prove to be a 
transient phenomenon, particularly if the integration of information technology 
accelerates drug development efforts. However, despite optimistic predictions in 
the past,31 information technology has not yet yielded significant efficiencies. 
This failure makes experimentation with supplementary approaches imperative.  
Another candidate for undertaking financially risky target validation is aca-
demia. Indeed, a key economic argument for public funding of science is that the 
private sector will tend to undersupply research with uncertain commercial po-
tential.32 Even though it may need some assistance in identifying which targets 
are most likely to bind drug-like molecules, the academic sector generally pos-
sesses the combination of skills needed for assay development.33 But most aca-
demics have lacked systematic access to high-throughput screening and to the 
small molecule libraries necessary for comprehensive target validation. Instead, 
academics who desire access to small molecules in a pharmaceutical firm’s li-
brary must negotiate terms of access and the corresponding intellectual property 
considerations on an ad hoc basis. Knowledgeable observers have long suggested 
that the transaction costs associated with these individualized negotiations consti-
tute a significant barrier.34
tors. See Henry Grabowski et al., Entry and Competition in Generic Biologics, 28 MANAGERIAL &
DECISION ECON. 439 (2007). 
       30. See, e.g., Arthur Klausner, Mind the (Biomedical Funding) Gap, 23 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1217 (2005) (tracking the history of funding for research, and noting the reluc-
tance of venture capital firms to fund upstream biomedical ventures). 
31 One of the authors of this Article previously made some optimistic predictions in this regard. Arti 
K. Rai, The Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing Innovation Incentives, 
Cost, and Access in the Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 173.  
       32. See Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609 (Richard R. Nelson ed., 1962) (discussing 
problems of uncertainty, indivisibility, and lack of appropriability involved in the production of 
information).
       33. See Adrian J. Ivinson, Letter to the Editor, University Investment in Drug Discovery, 310 
SCIENCE 777 (2005) (contending that academics have been underutilized in drug research and dis-
covery). 
       34. See Lipinski, supra note 9, at 382 (discussing individualized negotiations between principal 
investigators and pharmaceutical firms). 
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A recent survey of 414 academic scientists by John Walsh, Charlene Cho, 
and Wesley Cohen provides some evidence of the magnitude of these costs. In 
general, academic scientists report that negotiations between industry and aca-
demia concerning materials are likely to take longer, and cause more delay, than 
negotiations within academia: thirty-five percent of such negotiations require 
more than a month (as contrasted with twenty-one percent of negotiations with 
university suppliers) and sixteen percent of such negotiations result in a research 
delay of over one month (as contrasted with six percent of academic negotia-
tions).35 Where the material in question is a drug, the transaction becomes par-
ticularly arduous. All other factors being equal, an academic’s request for a drug 
(whether from industry or from another academic) was one-twelfth as likely to be 
fulfilled as requests for other materials.36
Strains in academic-industry negotiations concerning drug-related materials 
should come as no surprise. Such negotiations would typically become an option 
only in cases where the firm’s research on a drug compound had progressed to 
the point of disclosure through publication (and associated patenting).37 Disclo-
sure would serve to alert the academic researcher that a firm had discovered a 
promising compound. At that stage, much would be known about the drug com-
pound, which would make the resulting transactions of relatively high value. The 
firm would probably demand significant compensation for transferring the drug. 
In fact, empirical data indicates that seventy percent of agreements involving the 
transfer of drugs to academics include reach-through rights on improvements.38
At some point, industry requests for reach-through rights in patented drugs 
may become routine. As matters currently stand, however, academics and univer-
sity technology transfer officers remain uncertain about the appropriate use of 
such rights,39 and their uncertainty can lead to impasse. The fact that seventy per-
       35. John P. Walsh et al., Where Excludability Matters: Material Versus Intellectual Property in 
Academic Biomedical Research, 36 RESEARCH POLICY 1184, 1185-87 (2007).
       36. Id. at 1190-91. When reporting this statistic, the authors do not control for whether the sup-
plier is an academic or is in industry. Thus it is not possible to determine whether requests for drugs 
were less likely to be fulfilled by industry suppliers than academic suppliers. 
       37. Cf. Lipinski, supra note 9, at 381 (discussing circumstances where a firm refers to a com-
pound in a peer reviewed publication). In order to preserve commercial value, the firm would pre-
sumably allow publications about the compound only after a relevant patent application had been 
filed. 
       38. Walsh et al., supra note 35, at 1193. A reach-through royalty is an industry term that refers 
to a royalty that extends beyond the licensed item to products made using the licensed item. 
       39. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining Over the Transfer of Proprietary Research Tools, in
EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 223 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. 
eds., 2001). It is also noteworthy that while academics often ignore patents on research materials 
and make the materials in-house if they have the ability to do so, drug patents represent a prominent 
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cent of agreements to transfer drugs to academics also include some restrictions 
on publication40 no doubt exacerbates difficulties in negotiation.  
Of course, information could flow in the opposite direction. Firms do moni-
tor academic publications to determine whether researchers are working on 
promising targets. In some cases they successfully form partnerships with the 
academics in question.41 But surmounting difficulties in negotiation across the 
academic-industry divide appears challenging in this context as well. In the sur-
vey by Walsh and his colleagues, academic respondents admitted to failing to 
fulfill thirty-one percent of requests for materials from industry (as contrasted 
with only six percent from other academics).42
 B. Attempts To Bridge the Public-Private Divide 
More standardized legal documentation is one obvious mechanism for re-
ducing transaction costs in transfers of drug-related materials between the private 
sector and academics. In general, standardized contracts can produce positive ex-
ternalities that reduce transaction costs for users,43 and efforts in this direction 
could be helpful. However, because the transactions in question are likely to be 
of high value, full standardization will be difficult to achieve, or even affirma-
tively undesirable. Significant benefits may accrue from some level of customi-
zation. Moreover, the creation of standardized agreements represents a collective 
action problem.44 Given the divergent perspectives of academia and the private 
sector, solving this problem may not be straightforward.45
Even if standardized agreements were successfully created and imple-
exception. See Walsh et al., supra note 35, at 1192. In the case of drugs, both lack of in-house ex-
pertise and patents represent barriers to use. Id.
       40. Walsh et al., supra note 35, at 1193. 
       41. Telephone Interview with Allen Roses, Senior Vice President of Pharmacogenetics, 
GlaxoSmithKline, in Research Triangle Park, N.C. (Apr. 18, 2006) [hereinafter Roses Interview] 
(discussing partnerships that firms sometimes form upon reading of interesting work by academic 
researchers).
       42. Walsh et al., supra note 35, at 1191. 
       43. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Con-
tracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 720-30 (1997) (discussing 
learning benefits conferred on later users and “network benefits” conferred on contemporaneous 
users).
       44. Id. at 736-40 (discussing “coordination” problems). 
       45. In some cases, implementation of standardized agreements can also represent a collective 
action problem. See Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of 
Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 306 (2003) (discussing failure of collective action 
in university implementation of the standardized Uniform Biological Materials Transfer Agree-
ment).
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mented, the universe of transactions would be limited to those circumstances in 
which significant work had already been carried out. Drug discovery might be 
accelerated, but only to a limited extent. To put the point another way, the prob-
lem is only partly one of transaction costs in instances where transactions might 
currently occur. More fundamentally, under the existing regime, insufficient 
numbers of transactions—specifically, screens of potentially interesting assays 
against large volumes of small molecules—occur in the first instance.
A more comprehensive response to the “valley of death” problem is the Mo-
lecular Libraries Initiative (MLI), undertaken by the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) several years ago.46 Although the purposes of the MLI go beyond target 
validation, one key goal is to use public funding to advance research on targets to 
a stage that would elicit industry interest. The MLI reflects NIH’s recognition of 
three key technological changes: first, that recent research in genomics (e.g., the 
Human Genome Project) has produced many new potential drug targets; second, 
that enormous increases in high-throughput screening power make the screening 
of hundreds of thousands of molecules a day possible for academic centers; and 
third, that academic centers now have the capacity to efficiently synthesize large 
numbers of chemical molecules.47
The MLI has created a “Molecular Libraries Small Molecule Repository” at 
the San Francisco facilities of Discovery Partners International.48 It has been pay-
ing, and will continue to pay, academic researchers with expertise in medicinal 
chemistry to generate molecules to populate this public domain repository.49 Cur-
rently, the repository contains about 100,000 small molecules (some of which 
may duplicate molecules held in pharmaceutical firm libraries). This repository 
consists of four molecular classes: “specialty sets,” including compounds with 
known biological activity, such as drugs and toxins; natural products; “targeted 
libraries” for specific, high-profile proteins; and diversity compounds.50 Ten aca-
demic centers have received funding to use this repository to perform high-
       46. See generally Austin et al., supra note 8 (describing the background and goals of the MLI).
       47. See Nat’l Insts. Health, Overview, Molecular Libraries and Imaging, http://nihroadmap. 
nih.gov/molecularlibraries/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2007). In addition to the MLI, various individual 
public institutions offer some HTS capability. For a list, see Solomon Nwaka & Alan Hudson, In-
novative Lead Discovery Strategies for Tropical Diseases, 5 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 941, 
947 (2006). However, the MLI is the most ambitious effort.  
       48. Molecular Libraries Initiative, General Information, http://mli.nih.gov/mlsmr/general-
information (last visited Oct. 30, 2007).
       49. Id.
       50. NIH Molecular Libraries, A Roadmap Initiative, MLSMR Project, http://mlsmr.glpg.com/ 
MLSMR_HomePage/identify.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2007). Targeted libraries include modula-
tors of prominent protein families, such as proteases, kinases, ion channel proteins, and nuclear re-
ceptor sets. Diversity compounds include all other compounds. Id.
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throughput screening on assays submitted by the research community.51
The assays pertinent to this effort encompass more than simply proteins that 
are potential drug targets.52 As NIH recognizes, small molecules available in the 
public domain for all researchers are likely to be extremely valuable as research 
tools that will further basic understanding of biological pathways not necessarily 
related to direct drug development. Nevertheless, one of NIH’s goals is to en-
courage target validation, so as to narrow the gap between academic outputs and 
commercial investment and produce more breakthrough drugs.53
In assessing the more directed goal of generating validated targets, it is im-
portant to recognize that the molecules in the public repository are likely to be of 
lower quality (in terms of target specificity, metabolic attributes, toxicity and 
other relevant features) than those held by pharmaceutical firms. Although aca-
demics and the public sector more generally are beginning to achieve some ex-
pertise in medicinal chemistry,54 they still do not possess the level of expertise 
available in the pharmaceutical industry. This handicap may make the MLI target 
validation goal harder to attain. More comprehensive validation may await con-
firmation by a private firm’s screening against a more “drug-like” molecule in its 
own library. 
One might argue that private firms should be willing to undertake this addi-
tional work. Under the default rules of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 (which gave 
universities broad discretion to secure patents on federally funded research),55 as 
well as NIH rules specific to the MLI program,56 universities may patent targets 
or associated assays. Thus, following the conventional vision of Bayh-Dole,57 a 
       51. Nat’l Insts. Health, New Paradigm Will Help Identify Leads for Drug Discovery, 
http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/july2006/nhgri-24.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2007). 
       52. Other assays will include “protein-protein interactions, splicing events, and diverse cellular 
and even organismal phenotypes.” Austin et al., supra note 8, at 1139.
       53. Id. at 1138 (noting goal of target validation).
       54. Thus, it appears that the NIH Chemical Genomics Center, which is part of the MLI, has 
identified three classes of molecules that might be useful in treating Gaucher’s disease and is cur-
rently working on optimizing their activity and reducing toxicity. See Press Release, Nat’l Insts. 
Health, Novel Approach Targets an Inherited Disorder: NIH Chemical Genomics Center Jumpstarts 
Drug Development in Public Sector (July 23, 2007), available at http://www.genome.gov/2552214. 
In addition, according to Center director Chris Austin, the Center’s specific use of quantitative 
high-throughput screening techniques, which allows chemical compounds to be tested at different 
concentrations, is likely to reduce false positives and false negatives. Id.
       55. Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at 35 
U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000)).
       56. See NIH MLSCN Project Team Position on Data Sharing and IP in the MLSCN Program 
(Oct. 15, 2005) (on file with authors).
       57. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and 
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private firm might hedge the risk involved in this additional work by obtaining an 
exclusive license to the patented target or assay. However, given venture capital-
ists’ current reluctance to invest in relatively early-stage patents,58 these exclu-
sive licenses may not suffice.  
In any event, experimentation with another alternative—direct screening of 
academic assays against a pool of the small molecule libraries held by pharma-
ceutical firms—would eliminate some unnecessary intermediate work and could 
also reduce the transaction costs associated with licensing targets. To the extent 
that such a pool encompassed distinct contributions from several firms,59 it might 
contain considerably more molecules than the current group of 100,000 held in 
the public-domain repository.  
In sum, the impasse in genomic science presents the following underlying 
characteristics. First, too few qualified researchers are able to use screening as-
says against the small molecule libraries held as trade secrets by discovery-
oriented pharmaceutical firms.60 In particular, academic scientists with the talent 
to design assays lack access to these libraries. Second, to the extent that the li-
braries held by individual, discovery-oriented pharmaceutical firms differ from 
each other, it would be advantageous for academics to conduct screening assays 
against a pool that contains portions of all the libraries held by discovery-
oriented firms.61
If such a pool were created, it is unlikely that pharmaceutical firms would 
contribute molecules about which they already possessed significant information 
(let alone molecules they considered potential lead compounds). Even so, a pool 
that included some substantial subset of pharmaceutical firms’ compounds—for 
example, “diversity” compounds about which little was known—could prove ex-
tremely useful.
II. MODELS FOR MULTI-FIRM, PUBLIC-PRIVATE COLLABORATION
As a supplement to current approaches such as the MLI and to possible fu-
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1698-99 (1996) 
(discussing motivations behind the Bayh-Dole Act); Arti K. Rai, Regulating Scientific Research, 
Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 95-97 (1999). 
       58. See supra text accompanying notes 30. 
       59. For a discussion of questions regarding overlap in molecular library contents, see infra Sec-
tion III.A.
       60. Our research suggests that pharmaceutical firms may conduct fewer than one hundred 
screens per year against their whole library. See Roses Interview, supra note 41.
       61. Molecule libraries held by firms that do not seek to discover new targets would be much 
less useful, as those libraries would primarily contain molecules that work against existing, already 
validated targets.  
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ture efforts, including standardized contracts, we suggest a novel, large-scale 
public-private model. This collaborative approach would draw upon some recent 
experimentation that pharmaceutical firms are already conducting in this area. 
Moreover, it would respond to the advice that analysts have been giving the 
pharmaceutical industry for years—that it must “fundamentally review [its] R&D 
business models.”62 In this Part, we describe inter-firm, public-private collabora-
tions in the areas of safety and efficacy upon which our proposed approach 
would draw. Part III describes our proposed collaboration in detail. 
A. Existing Collaborations on Toxicity and Efficacy 
Until recently, pharmaceutical companies paid insufficient attention to opti-
mizing particular characteristics of small molecules, such as toxicity and “phar-
macokinetics” (i.e., absorption, diffusion, metabolism, and excretion), which are 
important for drug safety and efficacy in the human body.63 For example, firms 
sometimes designated a “lead” compound, and assembled a full team around it, 
solely because the compound had shown significant activity (affinity and selec-
tivity) in a high-throughput laboratory screen against an assay containing a target 
protein.64 Thus, firms were making a substantial investment without any good in-
formation about how the body would respond to the potential drug. In recent 
years, analysts have recognized that the lack of early attention to pharmacoki-
netic and toxicity-related characteristics of proposed small molecules was a fac-
tor in the growing number of pipeline failures, including costly failures at late 
stages of clinical testing or even after FDA approval for commercial marketing.65
Pharmaceutical firms have worked diligently to address this problem. As an 
initial matter, they purged their libraries of molecules that are likely to be 
“grit”—for example, molecules that are non-selective inhibitors of many differ-
ent targets or that have well-known pharmacokinetic or toxicological liabilities.66
Firms are also enhancing the quality of their libraries with the help of specialized 
suppliers of small molecules. Moreover, prior to selecting lead compounds for 
       62. DataMonitor, supra note 10.
       63. See GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 87 (finding that failure rates in human clinical trials 
based on lack of safety or efficacy were eighty-two percent in the 1996-99 period and ninety-one 
percent in the 2000-03 period). 
       64. Bleicher et al, supra note 19, at 370 (“It was not uncommon for a single [hit] compound to 
be considered a ‘lead’ structure.”). 
       65. Id.
       66. Telephone Interview with Allen Roses, Senior Vice President of Pharmacogenetics, 
GlaxoSmithKline, in Research Triangle Park, N.C. (Dec. 19, 2006) (on file with authors). See also
Lipinski, supra note 9, at 381 (discussing the use of the Lipinski “rule of 5” to filter out compounds 
that are unlikely to be absorbed orally). 
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optimization, pharmaceutical firms have been supplementing high-throughput 
screening with another stage of focused inquiry into properties necessary for 
safety and efficacy in the human body.67   
The pharmaceutical industry is also advancing safety and efficacy 
goals by means of public-private collaborative partnerships. Specifically, 
in establishing at least two such consortia, firms have recognized that an 
optimal level of inquiry into safety or efficacy may require knowledge not 
contained within the boundaries of a single firm. To the extent that any 
participating pharmaceutical firm finds standard, early biological signs 
(also known as biomarkers) of drug toxicity or efficacy, all the other firms 
in the consortium could use this information for a variety of efficiency-
enhancing functions.  
For example, biomarkers might help to provide expedited preclinical 
drug safety evaluation as well as early indicators of clinical safety and ef-
ficacy.68 They could also be used to troubleshoot compounds that fail pre-
clinical drug safety testing.69 Whenever the Food and Drug Administration 
approved a particular biomarker as a reliable indicator of safety or efficacy 
for a variety of drugs, it might become an industry standard around which 
all competing firms could converge. As the National Academy of Sciences 
noted in a recent report endorsing horizontal biomarker consortia, these 
“precompetitive projects (most likely unrelated to a particular drug) would 
be enabling to the field.”70
In one recently formed collaboration, the Predictive Safety Testing 
Consortium (PSTC), all of the major pharmaceutical firms have commit-
ted to sharing internally-developed laboratory methods that predict the 
safety of new treatments.71 They have also committed to performing vali-
dation experiments on laboratory methods developed by other consortium 
       67. See Andrew L. Hopkins, Michael J. Witty & Solomon Nwaka, Mission Possible, 449 
NATURE 166, 168 fig. (2007) (discussing steps such as cell-based or animal model testing).
       68. See, e.g., Toxicogenomic Cross-Validation Consortium Agreement § 2.1 (Jan. 20, 2006) 
(on file with authors) [hereinafter Consortium Agreement] (discussing the use of “safety bio-
markers” for expediting preclinical and clinical drug development). 
       69. See id. § 2.1(c) (discussing such troubleshooting).  
       70. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., CANCER BIOMARKERS: THE PROMISES AND CHALLENGES OF 
IMPROVING DETECTION AND TREATMENT 6 (2007), available at http://books.nap.edu/catalog/ 
11892.html.
       71. Consortium Agreement, supra note 68, § 3.2 (stating that members “must be willing and 
able to contribute one or more nominated exploratory Safety Biomarkers or other information or 
Materials for use in Consortium research activities”). Note that the Predictive Safety Testing Con-
sortium was formerly known as the Toxicogenomic Cross-Validation Consortium. 
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members.72 As a result, under the PSTC, experts from multiple firms work 
on sequential phases of the same project to develop tests of drug safety.
The PSTC agreement relies heavily on a non-profit, trusted intermedi-
ary, Critical Path, of which the FDA is a founding member. Critical Path is 
responsible for consortium management. For example, it collects member-
ship fees from pharmaceutical firm participants, coordinates the selection 
of research projects, and (with the assistance of an advisory committee 
composed of Critical Path and pharmaceutical firm representatives) man-
ages the flow of any confidential information.73 If the PSTC advisory 
committee deems it appropriate to seek patents on technology generated 
by the consortium, Critical Path will own the patent rights.74
While the PSTC focuses on tests for safety, the recently-formed Bio-
markers Consortium aims to encompass research that identifies good bio-
markers of both drug safety and efficacy.75 Like the PSTC, the Biomarkers 
Consortium includes all of the major pharmaceutical firms, and it allows 
scientists at competing firms to contribute their expertise to the develop-
ment of specific biomarkers. As with the PSTC, public sector agencies—
most prominently the non-profit Foundation for the NIH, which manages 
public-private partnerships for NIH—play a major role in selecting re-
search projects and in managing the flow of funding.76
       72. See id. (stating that members must “perform validation work with respect to one or more 
Safety Biomarkers . . . and have the capability to cross-validate Safety Biomarkers”). 
       73. See id. §§ 5.2, 6.1 (discussing various aspects of Critical Path’s management role).
       74. See id. § 8.2(a) (noting the role of the advisory committee in determining whether to pursue 
formal patent rights); id. § 8.2(b) (stating that “[e]ach Member performing any activities under a 
Research Project hereby assigns to C-Path all of such Member’s right, title, and interest in and to 
any and all Consortium Technology”). The PSTC recently submitted twenty-three proposed bio-
markers that could be used to identify kidney toxicity in preclinical animal testing. See Bernadette 
Toner, Predictive Safety Testing Consortium Submits First Biomarkers to FDA for Qualification,
GENOME WEB DAILY NEWS, June 21, 2007, http://www.genomeweb.com/issues/news/140703-
1.htm. It is unclear whether any patent rights have been sought. 
       75. Press Release, Foundation for the NIH, Public-Private Partnership Forms the Biomarkers 
Consortium To Advance the Science of Personalized Medicine (Oct. 5, 2006), available at 
http://www.fnih.org/news/TBC_Press_Release.shtml (noting that “the FDA can use biomarkers to 
determine whether drugs can safely and effectively treat disease”). The Biomarkers Consortium 
also plans to identify biomarkers for early disease detection. See id. That research goal is not di-
rectly relevant here. 
       76. See FOUND. FOR THE NIH, THE BIOMARKERS CONSORTIUM, TWO-PHASED PROJECT
APPROVAL PROCESS: CONCEPT CLEARANCE AND PROJECT PLAN APPROVAL 3 (2006), available at 
http://test.fnih.org/Biomarkers%20Consortium/Project_Clearance.pdf (showing a flowchart that 
details responsibilities of the FNIH Board). While the PSTC funds its research projects from mem-
bership fees, the Biomarkers Consortium agreement requires the Foundation for the NIH to seek 
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Research on biomarkers will ultimately yield products, such as safety 
assays, that are beneficial to multiple pharmaceutical firms, but are 
unlikely to represent a core product for any firm. For this and other rea-
sons, both of these consortia require ex ante commitments to relatively 
liberal licensing agreements for any intellectual property their common ef-
forts may generate.  
In the case of the PSTC, members agree that the objective of the con-
sortium is to achieve “broad public dissemination of the results of the re-
search and development projects conducted pursuant to this Agreement.”77
Patents are to be sought only in cases where the advisory committee de-
termines that they would promote dissemination of discoveries.78 More-
over, Critical Path is obligated to license any patents it may own to all 
comers on commercially reasonable terms.79
In contrast with the PSTC, the Biomarkers Consortium does not as-
sign intellectual property rights to a trusted intermediary. Rather, inventor-
ship is governed by the default rules of U.S. law, and ownership is defined 
by the policies of the inventor’s employer.80 Nonetheless, for all new data 
and inventions arising out of a particular project, all participants that have 
an ownership interest in the intellectual property generated must grant to 
all other participants a “non-exclusive, remuneration-free license.”81
B. Expanding the Collaborative Approach 
The formation of collaborative horizontal partnerships to address safety and 
efficacy raises the question of whether other, somewhat analogous, but more am-
bitious forms of collaboration could successfully address problems of translation. 
Specifically, we ask whether large-scale collaboration might improve translation 
by the academic sector of large volumes of upstream biological information into 
“validated targets” and potential drug candidates that would be of interest to in-
dustry. Like safety and efficacy, translation arguably entails further improvement 
of relatively undifferentiated trade secret information held by multiple firms. 
This improvement process may be greatly enhanced through evaluation by multi-
ple parties.
specific funding for each new project. Id.
       77. Consortium Agreement, supra note 68, § 8.2(a).
       78. See id.
       79. Id. § 8.3(b). 
       80. FOUND. FOR THE NIH, THE BIOMARKERS CONSORTIUM, GENERAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND DATA SHARING PRINCIPLES 5 (2006), available at http://test.fnih.org/Biomarkers% 
20Consortium/IP_Policies.pdf. 
       81. Id.
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Like the PSTC and the Biomarkers Consortium, our proposed partnership 
would use a trusted intermediary to facilitate firm participation. Additionally, like 
the Biomarkers Consortium, it could use the lure of public funding to stimulate 
greater participation by the private sector. Unlike these other consortia, however, 
our partnership would produce outputs—potential drug candidates—that engen-
der fierce inter-firm competition. Thus, while the PSTC does not link inventive 
contribution and ownership, our proposal would maintain a tight link between the 
two. Additionally, whereas the PSTC and the Biomarkers Consortium mandate 
relatively liberal licensing practices, our proposal would have no such mandate.  
In our proposed partnership, the trusted intermediary would necessarily play 
a more vigorous role in handling confidential information. As discussed further 
in Part III, the intermediary would itself conduct the high-throughput screening 
of the pharmaceutical firms’ molecules against assays contributed by academics. 
It would thus be the only party to the collaboration that possessed full knowledge 
of all of the assays and molecules that academics and pharmaceutical firms, re-
spectively, had contributed. 
 By merging academic talent in assay design with the high-quality but un-
derutilized research resource represented by the pharmaceutical firms’ libraries, 
our proposed public-private partnership aims to help the parties traverse the val-
ley of death that currently impedes research on drugs that address new targets. As 
contrasted with the alternative of complete vertical integration—for example, 
subsidizing discovery-oriented pharmaceutical firms to hire academics with assay 
design skills—the public-private partnership we envision would allow assay de-
signers access not simply to one firm’s library but instead to a larger, pooled li-
brary consisting of small molecule collections that a number of firms had con-
tributed. Unlike complete vertical integration, a public-private collaboration 
would not require academics to change career paths, which would make it more 
likely to succeed. Pharmaceutical companies contributing portions of their librar-
ies might still be subsidized to the extent that the trusted intermediary consented, 
at least initially, to bear some of the costs associated with establishing the pool 
and of providing academic researchers relevant grants.   
Pharmaceutical firms that contributed compounds to the pool would profit 
directly from any commercial drug that emerged from molecules they contrib-
uted. As we discuss in Part III, ordinary patent rules would deliver this result. 
Additionally, participating firms might find it in their interest to allow those who 
contributed molecules to the pool to receive a small share of the patentee’s prof-
its when one or more of their molecules fell within a subset of initially promising 
molecules identified by the screening process. In the latter instance, profit would 
be derived from a predetermined royalty stream to the contributing firms under 
an automatic license, as discussed in Section III.B below. 
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III. THE PROPOSED MULTI-FIRM PARTNERSHIP
In this Part, we outline the institutional framework and intellectual property 
strategies that could help stakeholders in both the private and public sectors to 
make better and more productive use of the aggregate stock of small molecules 
available for high-throughput screening. These proposals attempt to bridge the 
gap between patents and the public domain, which is currently regulated only by 
the application of trade secret law (or actual secrecy), to the private sector’s large 
hoards of small molecules.  
The ultimate objectives of our approach are to: 
1) Create a research regime in which qualified public-sector participants 
explore a larger and higher quality pool of molecules than is currently 
possible.
2) Design a contractually-constructed framework in which publicly 
funded university research could identify potential lead compounds 
without compromising patents on those compounds. 
3) Administer this voluntarily-adopted framework within a public-
private partnership that would more effectively translate upstream re-
search into truly innovative therapeutic advances, thereby contributing 
to overall public health. 
 A. The Threshold Question of Overlap 
An initial question regarding pool formation concerns possible overlap 
among molecules that participating firms may contribute. If, for example, it 
turned out that molecules contributed by different firms were substantially identi-
cal, then there would be little reason to pool the molecules. In that case, a model 
of multiple public-private partnerships, each built around contracts with a single 
firm, would become preferable. This alternative model is discussed in Section 
III.F below.
Because libraries are held by firms as trade secrets, the amount of overlap 
among them is currently unknown. More important for present purposes, it is un-
clear whether the molecules actually selected and contributed by participating 
firms would overlap. Even if we postulate that most firms would contribute so-
called “diversity” molecules (because these were the molecules about which they 
had little specific information), the extent of overlap between the various firms’ 
diversity molecules remains unknown. A trusted intermediary accordingly would 
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need access to structural data on a confidential basis in order to determine the de-
gree of overlap. It could then release this information (in suitably anonymized 
fashion) to participating firms.  
For example, in a situation where three firms had contributed molecular li-
braries, the intermediary might reveal that, of the total number of molecules con-
tributed, about twenty percent were duplicates owned by two firms and ten per-
cent by three firms. At that point, the participating firms would determine 
whether the degree of overlap was sufficiently small to justify going forward. If 
the firms decided to proceed, the pooled molecules would already have been col-
lated and any instances of duplication identified. This collation would, in turn, 
eliminate duplicative screening.  
B. A Two-Tiered Regime
Central to our proposed multi-firm partnership is a two-tiered system. At 
Tier 1, both academic external researchers and the participating companies could 
be viewed as operating behind a “veil of ignorance.”82 Although the researcher 
might possess some information about a potentially interesting assay, and the 
participating companies might hold some basic information about the molecules 
they contributed, information on both sides would be relatively inchoate and pre-
competitive in nature.  
Equally important, only the trusted intermediary would know about the full 
set of assays and molecules existing at Tier 1. Individual academic researchers 
and contributing firms would remain unaware of contributions by any other par-
ties. In contrast, research activities conducted at Tier 2, under the custom-made 
contractual arrangements described below, would necessarily have moved be-
yond this veil of ignorance.  
The trusted intermediary would host the pool and assume responsibilities for 
its day-to-day management and administration. The intermediary would also cer-
tify and perhaps fund the public-sector academics allowed to explore the mole-
cules held in the pool. Additional financial guarantees from participating univer-
sities might become necessary in order to assure pharmaceutical firms that 
contractual obligations regarding nondisclosure were respected.  
1. Tier 1: Behind the Veil of Ignorance
At the first tier of the partnership, researchers in approved academic institu-
tions (that is, institutions that had signed nondisclosure agreements and perhaps 
put up a bond to guard against misappropriation) would contribute assays. The 
trusted intermediary would then run these assays against the pooled collection of 
       82. Cf. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
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small molecules made available by participating firms. All molecules contributed 
to the pool would be tagged with a marker that tracked their corporate origin. The 
trusted intermediary would, however, code these markers so that researchers re-
ceiving information on “hits” resulting from high-throughput screening would 
not know the pharmaceutical firm owner of the molecules they were using.  
Successful high-throughput screening of these molecules would likely iden-
tify a subset of molecules as “hits”—in other words, molecules that showed sig-
nificant activity against the target in question and could lead to new drug candi-
dates. The academic who contributed the assay would receive coded results 
showing levels of activity for the relevant molecules, and the firms would receive 
some information as well. This Tier 1 information would be released in a struc-
tured way, in order to best facilitate the formation of an academic-pharmaceutical 
partnership for further target validation and drug development.  
Prior to being told that one or more of the molecules it had contributed rep-
resented a hit, the firm could withdraw a molecule at any point. In order to fore-
stall opportunistic behavior, however, once the trusted intermediary informed the 
firm that one of its molecules represented a hit, that molecule could not be with-
drawn. On the contrary, after a hit, the contributing firm would have an obliga-
tion to provide relevant structural information to the academic via the intermedi-
ary.83 Standardized licenses governing first-tier access would forbid information 
disclosure or misappropriation.
For its part, the academic laboratory and associated university (communicat-
ing through the intermediary) would provide the firms that owned hit molecules 
with a general statement of the methodology used to develop its target. However, 
in order to maintain its bargaining position despite the absence of a patent,84 the 
academic institution would not identify that target.85 Therefore, at this point, the 
academic scientist would know the chemical structure of a number of compounds 
that showed activity against the target, while the pharmaceutical firm(s) would 
know that one or more molecules from their libraries had presented interesting 
research possibilities.
The public-sector scientist, with the assistance of the trusted intermediary, 
would attempt to determine which firm had the combination of hit molecules 
       83. For purposes of collation and determining overlap, the firm would already have provided 
this structural information to the intermediary. As discussed further in the illustrative example be-
low, see infra Section III.E, structural information is probably the primary information the firm 
would have. In particular, firms would be unlikely to contribute to the pool molecules about which 
they had significant positive information.  
       84. University participants in the partnership would be barred from seeking patents on assays 
or targets prior to participation in the screening program. See infra Section IV.B. 
       85. For further discussion of the university perspective, as well as the perspectives of other 
stakeholders, see infra Part IV. 
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most likely to yield a successful drug. The decision would presumably be based 
on an assessment of liabilities and assets associated with the structures in ques-
tion. Through the trusted intermediary, a firm could also, if it so desired, share 
with the scientist on a confidential basis any additional information that it might 
have. Presumably, it would do so in order to entice the scientist into a second-tier 
partnership.
A complication in the process would arise if one or more of the chosen 
firm’s hit molecules were duplicates of molecules owned by another firm. In all 
likelihood, co-ownership of even one molecule should remain a relatively rare 
occurrence because, as discussed earlier, if molecules contributed by different 
firms overlapped significantly, there would be little reason to move forward with 
a multi-firm pool.  
In the event of co-ownership, there are several options worth considering, 
and one to be avoided. The latter is the default route of future patent co-
ownership (e.g., co-ownership of a patent on a potential lead compound that 
emerged from the co-owned molecule). Patent law encourages strategic behavior 
on the part of co-owners by allowing each one to “make, use, offer to sell, or sell 
the patented invention . . . without the consent of and without accounting to the 
other owners.”86 Although this default approach has the virtue of facilitating li-
censing (because the consent of only one co-owner is needed), it also means that 
disagreement between co-owners undermines the existence of an effective patent 
monopoly. Under our current system of R&D financing, monopoly rights on 
drugs are critical for hedging the risk associated with the long and complex pre-
clinical and clinical development process.87
The simplest solution would allow the researcher to continue with the firm 
he or she had chosen, notwithstanding co-ownership of one or more hits. This op-
tion would be particularly useful if (as seems likely, given that the threshold in-
quiry would presumably have found relatively little overlap in contributions) 
only one or two molecules out of the chosen firm’s set of hits were co-owned. 
The co-owner might then be entitled to royalty-based compensation if the mole-
cule in question led to a marketable drug, but it would have avoided the cost and 
risk of follow-on work.  
       86. See 35 U.S.C. § 262 (2000). See generally Robert P. Merges & Lawrence A. Locke, Co-
Ownership of Patents: A Comparative and Economics View, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
586 (1990) (discussing possibilities for opportunistic behavior created by the law of co-ownership). 
       87. See, e.g., Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability 
Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not), (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552; cf. Tracy R. 
Lewis, Jerome H. Reichman & Anthony D. So, The Case for Public Funding and Public Oversight 
of Clinical Trials, ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, Jan. 2007, http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol4/iss1/art3/ (ar-
guing that clinical trials should be treated as a public good).
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In the rare case where all (or most) of the relevant molecules were co-
owned, the co-owning firms could set up a separate joint venture that would hold 
future patent rights. In order to avoid antitrust concerns in cases where the joint 
venture occupied a large share of the relevant research space, one of the firms 
could remain a silent partner that simply held a pre-determined equity stake in 
the joint venture. Importantly, the initial framework agreement would specify the 
alternatives available in situations of dual ownership so as to rule out the possi-
bility of co-ownership of patents. 
As noted earlier,88 it appears that some pharmaceutical firms have already 
formed public-private partnerships with academic researchers whose published 
work indicates that they are working on interesting targets. They have done so, 
however, on a limited, ad hoc basis. Our first tier public-private partnership 
would provide a standardized platform for the systematic formation of many 
more second tier relationships than currently exist. Not only would the basis for 
forming such relationships be put in place, but with routine access to a pool of 
high-quality small molecule libraries guaranteed, one would also expect the pub-
lic sector to develop many more validated targets that would be of interest to 
pharmaceutical companies.  
Essentially, firms would be outsourcing assay development and target vali-
dation to individual academics who are well placed to do this work, but who 
would otherwise be difficult to integrate into the firm vertically as employees.89
As contrasted with vertical integration, a public-private partnership would allow 
assay developers to run their assays against a broad array of molecules held by 
multiple firms. 
2. Tier 2: Beyond the Veil of Ignorance
Once the academic had chosen a prospective partner, second-tier negotia-
tions would commence. Because the terms of such second-tier partnerships are 
likely to vary quite substantially depending on the type of target at issue, we do 
not propose standard-form agreements for this tier. Presumably, the negotiated 
contract enabling Tier 2 research would further specify the expected relations of 
the parties during the drug development phase, and the distribution of expected 
royalties from patented lead compounds. Assuming the drug development proc-
ess proved successful, and the patented drug passed clinical trials and entered the 
stream of commerce, the patent owner (i.e., the pharmaceutical firm) would ob-
       88. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
       89. Cf. Bernard Munos, Can Open-Source R&D Reinvigorate Drug Research?, 5 NATURE 
REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 723, 723 (2006) (discussing the outsourcing of drug research-related labo-
ratory and clinical studies “to institutions with the requisite capacity through the help of matchmak-
ing software”). 
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tain patent rents exactly as occurs at present.  
A possible complication could arise, however, if the scientist and the phar-
maceutical firm could not successfully conclude a second-tier agreement. In that 
case, we would propose that the scientist retain the opportunity to negotiate with 
the owners of other molecules that had represented hits at Tier 1. The information 
obtained by the academic in the negotiations with the first firm would, of course, 
remain subject to confidentiality and nondisclosure agreements.
If a Tier 2 partnership was formed and subsequently dissolved, the magni-
tude of potential inter-firm information leakage could become sufficiently great 
as to rule out allowing the scientist to negotiate with other firms. In any event, 
the framework agreement for the partnership would have to provide for both of 
these contingencies. 
 An important question to be addressed in the Tier 2 agreement would con-
cern the timing of any eventual publication by the academic. Although we do not 
propose standard form agreements at Tier 2, the framework agreement should en-
sure that the academic can publish his or her findings as soon as appropriate ar-
rangements for patentability had been made. This would represent an improve-
ment over the current situation, where the available empirical evidence indicates 
that corporate sponsors sometimes require academics to withhold data well be-
yond the time necessary to file a patent.90
C. The Option of a Contractually-Constructed Liability Regime91
In addition to the structure outlined above, participating firms might also 
agree on a supplementary system of royalties that would govern compensation to 
any firm that had provided structural information about its molecules to a re-
searcher deciding among promising “hits.” In other words, firms would be con-
tracting into a subsidiary set of “take and pay rules,” or liability rules, rather than 
relying entirely on exclusive property rights.92 As a historical matter, liability 
rules have always modulated between exclusive property rights, on the one hand, 
       90. See, e.g., David Blumenthal et al., Relationships Between Academic Institutions and Indus-
try in the Life Sciences—An Industry Study, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 368, 371 (1996) (finding that 
fifty-six percent of corporate sponsors report that research results are sometimes kept confidential 
longer than the time required to file a patent).
       91. The term “contractually-constructed liability regime” is drawn from J.H. Reichman & Paul 
F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protec-
tionist Intellectual Property Environment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 315 (2003). 
       92. The classic reference is, of course, Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); see 
also Robert Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective 
Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996). 
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and the public domain, on the other.93 In modern times, codified liability regimes 
that provide ex ante entitlements to compensation for certain uses (but not neces-
sarily a right to exclude others from use) have been adopted in some intellectual 
property systems,94 and in at least one international treaty.95
One feature of liability rules is that, even in the absence of legislative fiat, 
they may be voluntarily adopted whenever stakeholders seek to obtain a private 
ordering with outcomes that differ from what the default rules of intellectual 
property law might otherwise provide.96 For example, various commentators 
have discussed patent pools as an example of contractually-constructed liability 
rules.97 Similarly, contractually-constructed liability rules are sometimes used by 
patent holders as a mechanism for generating revenue from background property 
rights. (Indeed, proponents of the “one monopoly profit” thesis would argue that 
patent holders should generally be indifferent between using liability rules and 
exploiting their monopoly exclusively.)98 When Stanford University famously 
       93. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Saving the Patent Law from Itself: Informal Remarks Concerning 
the Systemic Problems Affecting Developed Intellectual Property Regimes, in PERSPECTIVES ON 
PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 289 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003).
       94. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy, 13 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 475, 504-20 (1995) (stressing the need for a new intellectual property 
paradigm based on liability rules for cumulative and sequential innovation); J.H. Reichman, Legal 
Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2477 (1994) (dis-
cussing an Italian regime protecting construction designs and technical drawings); id. at 2480 (dis-
cussing the British Design Law of 1988, since repealed by the E.U. Design Regulation); see also
Merges, supra note 92, at 1308-09 (discussing 17 U.S.C. § 115, a liability regime for sound re-
cordings of copyrighted musical works).
       95. F.A.O. Res 3/2001, International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agricul-
ture, Nov. 3, 2001, http://www.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/itpgr.htm (imposing a compensatory liability re-
gime on those who make commercial applications derived from public-domain seeds). 
       96. See J.H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpat-
entable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743 (2000); see also Jerome H. Reichman & Tracy Lewis, 
Using Liability Rules To Stimulate Innovation in Developing Countries: Application to Traditional 
Knowledge, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A 
GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 337 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 
2005).
       97. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 92, at 1340-52. As Merges discusses, the typical patent pool 
involves multiple firms agreeing voluntarily to refrain from exercising their rights to exclude. In-
stead of asserting patent rights, firms contribute the rights to a package license that is available on 
reasonable terms either to participants in the pool or to all comers. Id. In recent years, the pooling 
of patents around information technology industry standards has become quite common. See, e.g.,
Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross-Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting,
in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam Jaffe et al. eds., 2001).
       98. For an excellent discussion of the implications of the “one monopoly profit” thesis for plat-
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made its Cohen-Boyer patent on DNA manipulation techniques available to all 
users willing to pay specified royalties under a non-exclusive license, it voluntar-
ily converted the exclusive rights conferred by its patent to a liability regime.99
As discussed further below,100 we believe the possibility of a liability rule 
payment could induce greater participation by pharmaceutical firms. This com-
pensatory liability payment (say, on the order of three to five percent) would be-
come available to firms if any of their molecules fell within the class of promis-
ing “hits” at the initial stage of high-throughput screening. Firms would 
accordingly benefit from income streams not only in circumstances where they 
actually undertook the expensive and risky follow-on work that led to a patented 
marketable drug, but also if they contributed a small amount (in the form of 
structural information on a hit) to upstream work. In this manner, firms could, to 
some extent, mitigate the overall risks of drug development.101
The framework agreement for our proposed partnership would spell out any 
ex ante liability rule entitlements that the participating firms had agreed to adopt. 
The intermediary would also collect and share data concerning the impact of the 
liability regime as a cost-sharing and risk-reducing technique over time. How-
ever, in the event that such obligations triggered antitrust difficulties or deterred 
participation (perhaps because firms doing the follow-on work resisted the liabil-
ity rule as an unacceptable “reach-through royalty”),102 they remain an optional 
feature of our proposal.
D. Adding New Participants  
The public-private partnership we propose would be most likely to succeed 
if the founding members were firms with robust libraries that continued to be ac-
tive in the search for new targets. At the same time, it would be inopportune, 
counterproductive, and possibly illegal as a matter of antitrust law to foreclose 
the possibility that other firms might join the pool. The pool members would thus 
be well-advised to organize from the outset the conditions of future membership.  
Because of the manner in which the pool would be structured—specifically, 
form technologies, and of situations where the thesis might not apply, see Joseph Farrell & Philip 
Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergency of 
Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 104, 105-19 (2003).  
       99. For a discussion of the Cohen-Boyer licensing strategy, see Rai & Eisenberg, supra note
45, at 300. 
     100. See infra Section IV.A. 
     101. We also believe that the innovation-related benefits of a liability rule scheme (in terms of 
inducing participation in the pool) are sufficiently large that a small royalty paid to competitors 
should not be deemed to violate antitrust law. See infra Section IV.D. 
     102. See supra note 38.  
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the fact that private-firm researchers would not have any access to the small 
molecule pool and that even access by academic researchers at Tier 1 would be 
restricted to information about potentially promising “hits”—adding additional 
members should be relatively straightforward. New members and their contribu-
tions would be protected by the same nondisclosure agreements as pre-existing 
members. Similarly, hit molecules contributed by new members would be treated 
in the same manner as hit molecules contributed by founding members.  
Notably, existing consortia, such as the PSTC, explicitly provide for the ad-
dition of new members. Under the PSTC framework agreement, new members 
that can contribute to biomarker validation and pay membership fees are allowed 
into the consortium as a matter of course.103
E. An Illustrative Example 
Consider the following stylized example of the manner in which our pro-
posed public-private partnership would work.104 Many researchers believe that 
Alzheimer’s disease is caused by the accumulation of short protein fragments 
that are formed when certain precursor proteins (known as amyloid precursor 
proteins) break down.105 An Alzheimer’s researcher (Researcher A) in University 
B determines that a previously unknown protein (protein C) appears to be cen-
trally involved in the breakdown of amyloid precursor proteins. She creates an 
assay designed to test whether a small molecule binds to protein C (“protein C 
binding assay”).
 Researcher A (and her employer, University B) have previously complied 
with all the requirements for participation in the screening pool. She and her uni-
versity have signed the relevant nondisclosure agreements and have posted the 
bond necessary to reinforce the pertinent nondisclosure rules. Thus, she is eligi-
ble to submit her assay to the trusted intermediary who will screen it against the 
aggregate collection of molecules that Companies 1, 2, and 3 have contributed to 
the pool.  
 The trusted intermediary will have previously compared the structure of the 
molecules submitted by these companies and presumably found only a small 
amount of overlap (e.g., only ten percent of molecules were owned by two firms 
and one percent were owned by three firms). Based on this small amount of over-
lap, the companies had decided to go forward with the pool.  
     103. Consortium Agreement, supra note 68, § 3.3. 
     104. Note that although the facts in this example are generally based on accurate scientific in-
formation, they are intended for illustrative purposes only. 
     105. See, e.g.,Vincent T. Marchesi, An Alternative Interpretation of the Amyloid  Hypothesis 
with Regard to the Pathogenesis of Alzheimer's Disease, 102 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 9093, 9093
(2005).
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 The trusted intermediary proceeds to screen the combined molecule libraries 
of all three companies against the protein C binding assay. The intermediary then 
gives the results, which include the raw data generated in the experiment, to Re-
searcher A. In consultation with the trusted intermediary, Researcher A deter-
mines that there is a group of seven molecules that show significant activity and 
might lead to promising new drugs. The trusted intermediary informs A that 
these molecules are owned by Companies 1 and 3—Company 1 owns three of 
the molecules, and Company 3 owns the other four.  
At this point, the trusted intermediary also informs Companies 1 and 3 that 
they have molecules that represent hits, but the companies do not learn that they 
are hits on protein C specifically. Companies 1 and 3 can no longer withdraw the 
relevant molecules from the pool, and they must provide Researcher A with in-
formation about the structures of the hit molecules. Researcher A and the trusted 
intermediary analyze the structures they have been given and the results of the 
assay, and on that basis decide that Researcher A and University B should at-
tempt to negotiate a Tier 2 agreement with Company 3. If an agreement is 
reached with Company 3, and subsequently results in a new drug, Company 1 
may be entitled to a three to five percent royalty as provided for in the framework 
agreement. If the negotiations with Company 3 fail, Researcher A and University 
B have the option of negotiating with Company 1.  
In the more complex case where one or a few of the molecules in Company 
3’s set of hits is also owned by another company (say Company 2), the decision-
making process would be governed by the rules upon which the stakeholders had 
previously agreed. For example, the framework agreement might provide that in 
most cases, Researcher A could simply continue working with Company 3, while 
Company 2 might become entitled to some predetermined compensation but 
would not participate in, or bear any risk associated with, downstream research. 
In the rare case that the relevant molecules were all co-owned, the framework 
agreement might enable Companies 2 and 3 to form a joint venture that owned 
any resulting patent rights.106
If this and similar ventures were to succeed, the framework agreement would 
have maximized opportunities to generate new drugs by multiplying the number 
of assays that were screened against an expanded chemical space. In this manner, 
our model would enable complex and risky research that might not otherwise 
have occurred under existing arrangements. More importantly, it could enable 
and greatly increase the likelihood of breakthrough therapeutic results on signifi-
cant diseases. 
     106. The possibility of using joint ventures in downstream work on a set of promising molecules 
drawn from different sources would depend on the attitude of the relevant antitrust authorities. We 
discuss the antitrust implications of these options below. See infra Section IV.D.
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F. Single Firm Public-Private Partnerships 
As previously observed, even if the trusted intermediary determined that the 
molecules that firms had contributed overlapped substantially, it would still be in 
the firms’ interest to undertake some sort of collaborative approach. In that case, 
however, a better approach might rely on one or more single firm public-private 
partnerships. A single-firm partnership would give academic researchers the op-
portunity to screen their assays against that portion of the firm’s library that the 
firm chose to make available. 
Single firm public-private partnerships would not require the level of organ-
izational infrastructure required by a broader pooling approach. A willing firm 
might simply invite interested academic researchers to submit assays, which it 
would then screen in-house against some subset of compounds within its proprie-
tary library. However, a trusted intermediary might remain useful in this context, 
especially if it could assist the firms in identifying potential academic research 
participants and their associated institutions.
For example, in the context of tropical diseases targets, it appears that the 
World Health Organization’s (WHO) Tropical Disease Network has organized a 
consortium of researchers who are interested in screening their targets against 
pharmaceutical firm libraries. Three firms—Pfizer, Merck Serono, and Chem-
tura—are now allowing this “TDR Compound Evaluation Network” to submit 
targets for in-house screening against a subset of the firms’ respective chemical 
libraries.107 The trusted intermediary might also help to fund the academic scien-
tists, guard against misappropriation of unpatented results by participants in the 
partnership, and set the conditions of eventual publication of research results.  
Because the “private” side of the partnership would, at any given time, be 
limited to a single firm, there would be no need for a two-tiered regime. Rather, 
qualified academics would simply submit assays to the firm in question. If and 
when a particular screening assay yielded a group of hits, the academic and the 
firm would then negotiate the terms of a public-private development partnership. 
As with the multi-firm partnership, the private firm would be free to withdraw 
molecules from the screening process up to the point when the molecule yielded 
a hit.
In the event that screening against the library of a given firm yielded no in-
teresting hits, the academic investigator might want to submit the assay to other 
firms that had made a subset of their libraries available. However, because ano-
nymity could not be preserved in a single-firm arrangement, “sequential” screen-
ing would depend on the first firm’s willingness to permit it.   
     107. Hopkins, Witty & Nwaka, supra note 67, at 169. 
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IV. ANALYZING THE COLLABORATION: STAKEHOLDER INCENTIVES AND 
TRADEOFFS
Having outlined the basic principles of our two-tiered proposal, we turn to a 
detailed discussion of the incentives that would induce stakeholders to enter into 
such an arrangement. We also briefly discuss salient antitrust issues pertinent to 
our proposal. 
A. The Firms’ Perspective 
Pharmaceutical firms stand to gain a great deal, and lose little, through par-
ticipation in our proposal. Current efforts to generate truly novel drugs are fail-
ing. Our proposal would leverage the expertise of publicly funded researchers in 
a manner that redounds to the benefit of the pharmaceutical industry as a whole 
while limiting aggregate costs and generating considerable efficiencies in the up-
stream research process.  
Firms will be concerned about the risk that potentially important trade secret 
information (specifically, molecular structure and the fact that a particular mole-
cule shows activity against an assay) might leak over to competitors. For this rea-
son, only academic researchers should be allowed access to such information. 
Those researchers who identified a promising molecule would be deterred from 
misappropriation not only by contractual obligations and required bonding, but 
also by their need to partner with the firm contributing the most promising mole-
cule in order to commercialize the research results.  
By contrast, allowing private-sector researchers entry into the pool would 
create undue risk of misappropriation and industrial espionage. Fear of such mis-
appropriation might deter firms from entering the pool in the first instance. Al-
ternatively, firms might be tempted to contribute only “bad” molecules. Indeed, 
fear of misappropriation is so great that various efforts to foster even a limited 
amount of inter-firm information exchange about molecular library contents in 
the past have foundered on the inability of firms to sufficiently disguise or 
“mask” information about molecular structure.108 Restricting participation to aca-
demic scientists—a prominent feature of our proposal—should prove attractive 
from the firms’ perspective.  
Moreover, even with respect to academic researchers, access to molecules 
would remain quite limited. The trusted intermediary would conduct the high-
throughput screening on submitted assays. At Tier 1, academic researchers would 
     108. See Elizabeth K. Wilson, Is Safe Exchange of Data Possible? Modelers in Need of Proprie-
tary Compounds Seek Ways To Share Information, But Not Structure, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING 
NEWS, Apr. 25, 2005, at 24, available at http://pubs.acs.org/cen/science/83/8317sci1.html (describ-
ing efforts to enable “safe exchange” of chemical structures).  
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receive results (and accompanying structural information) only with respect to 
molecules that represented hits. In exchange for this information, firms would be 
rewarded with the possibility of a collaboration as well as a potential royalty 
even if their firm was not chosen to undertake downstream development. 
However, leakage of some structural information between firms might occur 
in certain circumstances, namely, when an assay revealed hit molecules from two 
different firms. If an academic moved on to a Tier 2 collaboration with one firm, 
there is some concern that he might inappropriately use information about the 
other firm’s molecule(s). Similarly, if Tier 2 negotiations with one firm fell 
through, the researcher might take information derived from those negotiations 
into conversations with a second firm.  
To forestall these possibilities, the framework agreement for the partnership 
should explicitly prohibit researchers from using information derived from one 
firm in their dealings with another firm. Enforcement of such a provision might 
prove difficult, however. Thus, the firm that was not chosen might be best re-
warded for the risk of some level of leakage through the contractually-
constructed liability scheme discussed above.109
B. The Academic Researchers’ Perspective 
Researchers, and their universities, should be motivated to participate in the 
collaboration through financial incentives and the potential for groundbreaking 
discoveries. If academic researchers succeeded in validating a target, they, and 
their universities, would find themselves in a strong position to negotiate a favor-
able Tier 2 agreement with one of the companies contributing hit molecules.  
The academics would bring to the table their substantial knowledge of the 
assay and target, and the pharmaceutical firm would bring its information con-
cerning the relevant molecule, its expertise in medicinal chemistry, as well as all 
of its downstream development resources. If the resulting partnership yielded a 
commercially successful drug, the researcher and his university would secure a 
share of the revenues.110 They would also secure a reputational gain through 
     109. See supra Section III.C. 
     110. Note that this is a different claim from the argument that technology licensing (e.g., patent 
licensing) is likely to bring in substantial revenue. As many observers have noted, university patent 
licensing generally involves upstream technology with uncertain payoffs and therefore revenues are 
typically quite small. Only in the relatively unusual circumstance where the university sells rights 
to a drug is the revenue payoff substantial. See, e.g., Press Release, Emory University, Gilead Sci-
ence and Royalty Pharma Announces $525 Million Agreement with Emory University To Purchase 
Royalty Interest for Emtricitabine (July 18, 2005), available at http://www.news.emory.edu/ 
Releases/emtri/ (describing payment of $525 million for sale of royalty rights to anti-AIDS drug). 
Our proposal similarly would involve partnerships dealing with end-product drugs; therefore, reve-
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eventual publication of the breakthrough research. 
In our view, these financial and reputational benefits to the public research 
community should help to offset delays in publication that participating firms 
might deem necessary to protect commercially valuable information. Specifi-
cally, as noted earlier, the researcher exploring chemical space at Tier 1 would 
have to sign a nondisclosure agreement with respect to any structural data on 
molecules that he or she received.111 Additionally, at Tier 2, the researcher must 
be willing to forego publication of commercially valuable information until rele-
vant patents (e.g., on promising lead compounds) had been filed.  
The ultimate financial benefits should also mitigate certain limitations on 
university patenting that are likely corollaries of our proposed public-private 
partnership. Under current law, universities are entitled to seek intermediate pat-
ents on validated targets. In the proposed collaboration, universities would forgo 
such patents in exchange for a transactional commitment at Tier 2 by the phar-
maceutical company to a revenue stream from any drug that was ultimately de-
veloped. This revenue stream would recognize the significant research contribu-
tion of the university and its researcher.  
C. The Perspective of the Trusted Intermediary 
In order for the proposed public-private partnership to take off, the trusted 
intermediary would probably have to provide some seed funding. Specifically, 
the intermediary might, at least initially, bear the cost of funding researchers to 
develop assays, of conducting high-throughput screening, and of general pool 
administration. However, once the concept of pooling small molecule libraries 
had proved to be scientifically and economically viable, the firms themselves 
should be willing to subsidize many, if not all, of the activities in the collabora-
tion.
If the trusted intermediary were the NIH, or an NIH-funded proxy, our pro-
posal could be seen as complementary to its Molecular Libraries Initiative. While 
the MLI is likely to prove very useful in advancing basic knowledge about bio-
logical pathways, lack of access to small molecule libraries held by pharmaceuti-
cal firms may limit its success in target validation. At a minimum, the MLI will 
not typically result in potential lead compounds. More generally, two of the three 
themes highlighted in the current NIH Roadmap for Medical Research—
encouraging “new pathways for discovery” and supporting “research teams of the 
future,”112 (including interdisciplinary work and public-private partnerships)—
nue payoffs could be substantial.
     111. See supra Subsection III.A.2. 
     112. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, NIH ROADMAP FOR RESEARCH (2006), http://nihroadmap.nih.gov/ 
pdf/NIHRoadmap-FactSheet-Aug06.pdf.
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are specifically promoted by the terms of our proposal.  
The pharmaceutical companies could, of course, foot the bill for the entire 
initiative and establish their own trusted intermediary. We believe, however, that 
participation of a public entity remains desirable, even if the operation were to-
tally funded by the private sector. For example, the presence of a public-sector 
player would greatly simplify relations with academia and add a layer of indirect 
enforcement of nondisclosure rules that would reassure the participating firms. 
Likewise, a public sector presence would reinforce the academic scientists’ ex-
pectations that the public interest in shared research results would ultimately be 
respected, without compromising either side’s intellectual property rights. Fi-
nally, the presence of a public-sector player would greatly facilitate negotiations 
between the trusted intermediary and the antitrust authorities over time.
D.  Antitrust Concerns and the Public Interest 
If successful, our proposal would necessarily entail some level of collabora-
tion between firms that represent a significant percentage of the pharmaceutical 
industry. For the most part, only limited inter-firm R&D coordination or ex-
change of information would occur–largely confined to contexts where comple-
mentary assets had to be deployed in order to maximize research potential. Thus, 
we believe that our proposal should pass muster from the standpoint of both 
normative economic analysis and antitrust doctrine.  
The question of whether a competitive or concentrated (perhaps even mo-
nopolistic) market structure best promotes innovation has long been mooted in 
the economic literature. Joseph Schumpeter famously argued that concentration 
promotes risky innovation by allowing firms to limit diffusion of knowledge to 
competitors and thus appropriate more fully the benefits of their innovative ef-
forts.113 In contrast, Kenneth Arrow and others have asserted that monopoly 
power can dull incentives to innovate, particularly in situations where a new 
product would displace a product already produced by the monopolist.114
As antitrust doctrine has expanded its focus beyond end product markets, it 
too has examined the relationship between competition and innovation. Influ-
enced by Arrow’s work, in the mid-1990’s the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) adopted an “inno-
vation markets” analysis, which looks at competition in the R&D processes that 
produce end products.115 Under innovation markets analysis, a joint venture, li-
     113. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 81-106 (1942).
     114. See, e.g., Arrow, supra note 32. For a summary of these arguments, see Rai, supra note 26, 
at 824-25. 
     115. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 3.2.3 (1995) [hereinafter DOJ, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY], available at 
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censing agreement, or merger is suspect if it unduly limits the number of compet-
ing innovators and yields no offsetting innovation-related efficiencies.  
Although innovation markets analysis might imply a relatively strict review 
of R&D collaborations, the DOJ and FTC have emphasized how difficult it is to 
define an innovation market.116 In practice, the overriding focus in most cases is 
not market definition but whether the collaboration is likely to accelerate or slow 
the pace at which R&D efforts are pursued.117 The agencies specifically recog-
nize that “[t]hrough the combination of complementary assets, technology, or 
know how, an R&D collaboration may enable participants more quickly or more 
efficiently to research and develop new or improved goods . . . .”118
In the case of our proposed collaboration, the reality that R&D on new drug 
targets is very expensive and risky should make antitrust authorities more dis-
posed towards a Schumpeterian perspective on the resulting pharmaceutical in-
novation. Nonetheless, two aspects of our model might concern antitrust regula-
tors. First, the optional liability rule scheme we have proposed might be seen as a 
reach-through royalty that dulled incentives on the part of the firm enjoying the 
royalty to innovate independently. However, we think it is unlikely that a small 
royalty stream would significantly affect such incentives. The situation where no
one works on a molecule that modulates a new target is much more likely. In-
deed, it is the status quo.  
The second antitrust difficulty might involve the situation where co-
ownership of molecules required a substantial compensatory royalty or even a 
joint venture. In both cases, the argument in favor of allowing collaboration 
would rest on the fact that the assets in question were co-owned and therefore 
complementary.  
To address antitrust concerns expeditiously, we would propose that the ini-
tial framework agreement expressly address questions of co-ownership (and, if 
desired, liability rules), and that this agreement be vetted by the antitrust authori-
ties before any collaborative work began. The PSTC framework agreement pro-
vides an instructive example. It contains an “antitrust statement” that limits inter-
firm sharing of information to that necessary for purposes of biomarker valida-
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm (defining innovation markets); see also DEP’T
OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG 
COMPETITORS § 3.32(c) (2000) [hereinafter DOJ, COLLABORATION], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf (discussing innovation markets). 
     116. “The Agencies will delineate an innovation market only when the capabilities to engage in 
the relevant research and development can be associated with specialized assets or characteristics 
of specific firms.” DOJ, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 115, § 3.2.3; see also DOJ,
COLLABORATION, supra note 115, § 3.32(c).
     117. DOJ, COLLABORATION, supra note 115, § 3.31(a).  
     118. Id.
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tion and allows consortium members to pursue independent biomarker validation 
projects.119 We would envision a similar statement addressing antitrust concerns 
in our framework agreement. 
CONCLUSION: BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF THE COLLABORATIVE APPROACH
In developing our proposal for greater access to small molecule libraries, we 
have drawn upon models of inter-firm collaboration that the pharmaceutical in-
dustry is currently using for biomarkers. However, our approach is designed to 
work in settings different from the creation of biomarker standards, where rights 
in collaborative outputs must be tightly protected.  
For example, a similar approach maybe be useful in advanced materials en-
gineering research. Such research represents a context where inter-firm transfer 
of inchoate and unpatented, but nonetheless valuable, information is desirable.120
Contract-based exchange can be implemented so long as the connection between 
the inchoate information put in ex ante and the codified, differentiated informa-
tion that emerges ex post is reasonably clear. The presence of a trusted interme-
diary that polices contract breaches and prevents undesirable spillovers is also 
important.  
Our proposal attempts to embody all the features that are likely to facilitate 
contract-based exchanges of pre-patentable, but nonetheless valuable, informa-
tion. If academics and pharmaceutical firms are interested in truly innovative 
drug discovery, they should experiment with this effort to forge new and viable 
pathways across what has hitherto proved to be a largely impassable “valley of 
death.”
     119. See Consortium Agreement, supra note 68, at exhibit A. 
     120. Professor Krishna Rajan, Iowa State University, Presentation at the University of Tokyo 
Conference on Designing Global Information Commons for Innovation in Frontier Sciences (Nov. 
8, 2007) (conference notes on file with authors). 
